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UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n. Inc. v. Gulf Power Co., 122 S. Ct.
782 (2002). FCC Regulations: Attachments to utility poles for cable
television systems that provide high-speed Internet access for wireless
communications providers are considered "attachments" within the
meaning of the Pole Attachments Act.
FACTS: Under the Pole Attachments Act ("PAA"), the Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC") sets reasonable rates, terms
and conditions for certain attachments to telephone and electric
poles. In this action, certain pole-owning utility companies chal-
lenged an FCC order that interpreted the PAA to cover pole attach-
ments for cable television systems that provided high-speed Internet
and for wireless telecommunications providers. These utility compa-
nies contended that the FCC's interpretation was unreasonable.
ANALYSIS: First, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of
whether the cable television system that also provided high-speed
Internet access constituted an "attachment" under the PAA. There
was no dispute that an attachment by a cable television company that
only provides cable television is an "attachment" under the PAA.
The Court determined that the addition of the high-speed Internet ac-
cess or any other future additions to the cable television service
would change the character of the "attachment." This was the
Court's best reading of the statute - which it found to be unambigu-
ous. The Court noted that if the statute was ambiguous, it would de-
fer to the FCC's reasonable interpretation of the statutory definition
of "attachments" pursuant to the principle of Chevron-deference.
Second, the Court analyzed the question of whether wireless tele-
communication providers' equipment attached to a utility pole would
be subject to the PAA. The PAA applies to "telecommunications
service providers," defined as a service that offered telecommunica-
tions to the public for a fee. The Court concluded that a wireless
telecommunications provider is a "provider of telecommunications,"
therefore, its attachments to utility poles are governed by the PAA.
HOLDING: The Supreme Court held that cable television systems'
utility pole attachments that also provided high-speed Internet access
and wireless telecommunications providers' utility pole attachments
were "attachments" as defined by the PAA. Thus, the FCC's deci-
sion to assert jurisdiction over these attachments was reasonable.
IMPACT: This case is a loss for cable television systems with high-
speed Internet and wireless communications providers because their
attachments to utility poles will result in FCC regulation of rates,
terms and conditions. On the one hand, increased regulation of such
services may result in cost increases to consumer users. Yet regula-
tion of these attachments may prevent abuses by these service pro-
viders thereby protecting consumers from unfair business practices.
Zadvvdas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). Immigration Regulations:
Supreme Court determines that resident aliens ordered removed shall
NOT be held indefinitely.
FACTS: In this case the Supreme Court consolidated two immigra-
tion cases from the Fifth and Ninth Circuits concerning the same is-
sue. First, Zadvydas was a resident alien since 1956, but suffered a
long criminal record and was subsequently ordered removed from
the United States in 1994. However, all other possible nations re-
fused to acknowledge or extend citizenship to Zadvydas, and he was
therefore held indefinitely in the custody of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service ("INS"). Kim Ho Ma was also a resident
alien with a conviction for an aggravated assault. He was ordered to
be removed from the United States but found it impossible to gain
admittance to any other nation and was therefore held indefinitely.
The Court framed the issue as whether the post-removal period stat-
ute of the INS authorizes the Attorney General to detain a removable
alien indefinitely beyond the removal period or only for a period rea-
sonably necessary to secure the alien's removal.
ANALYSIS: The Court acknowledged that no court has jurisdiction
to review decisions in the discretion of the Attorney General, but
emphasized that this was not a challenge to an exercise of the Attor-
ney General's power but rather a challenge to the extent of that
power. The Court affirmed the principle that when a statute enacted
by Congress raises "a serious doubt" as to its constitutionality, the
Court must first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is
fairly possible to avoid reaching the constitutional question. The
Court noted that the civil confinement here at issue is not limited, but
potentially permanent, and the procedural protections available to
aliens in this situation are not sufficient to protect the fundamental
rights at issue here. Further, aliens inside the United States are enti-
tled to constitutional protections. The Court also noted that there
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was nothing found in the legislative history that demonstrated any in-
tent to authorize indefinite, perhaps permanent, detention. The Court
stated that whether a set of particular circumstances amounts to de-
tention beyond a period reasonably necessary to secure removal is
determinative of whether the detention is or is not pursuant to statu-
tory authority. Furthermore, the Court indicated that the basic federal
habeas corpus statute grants the federal courts authority to answer
that question. The Court determined that a "reasonable" period of
detention would fall somewhere between the statutory limit of ninety
days and the previously revised limit of six months. After that rea-
sonable time period, when the alien provides good reason to believe
that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonable
foreseeable future the government must rebut that showing in order
to keep the alien in detention.
HOLDING: The Supreme Court construed the INS statute to con-
tain an implicit "reasonable time" limitation, the application of
which is subject to federal court review.
IMPACT: This case was a victory for all aliens in United States de-
tention centers who have been held for periods longer than the period
defined as reasonable by the Court. While this case technically ap-
plies only to aliens who cannot find another country to accept them,
its reasoning can be used to argue in favor of release of many other
aliens who have been held for more than six months.
INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001). Immigration Law: Habeas re-
view of deportation proceedings and discretionary relief under the
Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(c), as amended 8 U.S.C. §
1182(c), is still available to aliens in some circumstances.
FACTS: Enrico St. Cyr was a citizen of Haiti admitted to the United
States as a lawful permanent resident in 1986. Ten years later, he
pled guilty in a state court to a charge of selling a controlled sub-
stance in violation of Connecticut law, a conviction that made him
deportable. Prior to the 1996 amendments to the Immigration and
Nationality Act ("Act"), St. Cyr would have been eligible for waiver
of deportation at the discretion of the Attorney General. However,
the Attorney General commenced removal proceedings after the im-
plementation of two amendments to the Act in 1996 - the Antiterror-
ism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA") and the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act ("IIRIRA").
Under the Attorney General's interpretation of those two statutes, he
no longer had discretion to grant such a waiver. In St. Cyr's habeas
corpus petition, he alleged that the restrictions on discretionary relief
from deportation contained in the 1996 amendments did not apply to
removal proceedings brought against an alien who pled guilty to a
deportable crime before their enactment. The district court and the
Second Circuit both accepted jurisdiction over his habeas corpus pe-
tition and agreed with this claim.
ANALYSIS: The issues in this case were (1) what impact the 1996
amendments to the Act had on the availability of habeas corpus ju-
risdiction; and (2) what impact those amendments had on conduct
that occurred before their enactment - specifically, the availability of
§ 212(c) discretionary relief from deportation. The Court stated that
for the INS to prevail in proving retroactive effect for the statute, it
must overcome both the strong presumption in favor of judicial re-
view of administrative action and the longstanding rule requiring a
clear statement of congressional intent to repeal habeas corpus. The
Court maintained that implications from statutory text or legislative
history are not enough to repeal habeas jurisdiction, but rather Con-
gress must articulate specific and unambiguous statutory directives
to effect a repeal. The Court then examined the issue of whether dis-
cretionary relief was available to St. Cyr. The Court noted the that a
statute will not be retroactively applied, unless the language of a
statute requires it or it is clear that Congress considered the possible
impacts on individuals should it retroactively apply the statute. Fi-
nally, the Court found that the expectations of individuals entering
into plea agreements, in addition to ambiguous congressional intent,
required a finding that § 212(c) relief was still available to aliens
who entered such plea agreements.
HOLDING: Habeas jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 was not re-
pealed by AEDPA and IIRIRA. The Court held that § 212(c) relief
remains available for aliens whose convictions were obtained
through plea agreements and who, would have been eligible for §
212(c) relief at the time of their plea under the law then in effect.
IMPACT: The Court has maintained the right of habeas corpus re-
view under AEDPA and HIRIRA, which was a big victory for immi-
gration attorneys seeking to help their clients get out of detention
centers across America. Further, the Court has, somewhat begrudg-
ingly, allowed discretionary waiver for convicted aliens.
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United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001). Customs Regula-
tions: The Supreme Court decides that tariff regulations are NOT enti-
tled to Chevron deference and that such regulations are entitled to re-
spect according to their degree of persuasiveness.
FACTS: Mead Corporation ("Mead") imports "day planners." In
1993, the United States Customs Service ("Customs") issued a ruling
letter changing the tariff classification from an "other" category to
"diaries... bound" category, subject to different tariff schedules.
Mead contested the tariff change in the Court of International Trade
("CIT"). The CIT granted the United States' motion of summary
judgment. Mead appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit. The court thought classification rulings had a
weaker Chevron claim than IRS interpretive rulings, and accordingly
gave no deference at all to the ruling classifying the Mead day plan-
ners and rejected the agency's ruling altogether. The Supreme Court
granted review to determine the limits of Chevron deference as owed
to administrative practice in applying a statute.
ANALYSIS: The issue before the Court was whether a tariff classi-
fication ruling by Customs deserves judicial deference. The Court
noted that administrative implementation of a particular statutory
provision qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears that Con-
gress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules car-
rying the force of law and the agency interpretation claiming defer-
ence was promulgated in the exercise of that authority. However,
the Court noted that the fair measure of deference to an agency
administering its own statute varies with circumstances, and courts
should look to the degree of the agency's care, consistency, formal-
ity, and relative expertness, as well as the persuasiveness of the
agency's position. Delegation of interpretive authority entitled to
Chevron deference can be either implicit or explicit, according to the
Court, and rules entitled to deference by the courts can be promul-
gated either through the use of formal adjudication or notice and
comment rulemaking. The Court found that interpretive rules fall
into neither of those categories and are therefore denied Chevron
deference. The Court maintained, however, that although tariff rul-
ings fall outside the realm of Chevron, Skidmore still allows for
some deference to an agency's interpretation, whatever its form.
Skidmore focuses on the given specialized experience, broadness of
the investigations and the information available to the agency, as
well as the value of uniformity applied in its administrative and judi-
cial understandings of what a national law requires. The Court
pointed out that in this situation, the regulatory scheme is highly de-
tailed and Customs can bring the benefit of specialized experience to
bear on the subtle questions in each case. A claim seeking Skidmore
deference will gain "the merit of its writer's thoroughness, logic and
expertness, its fit with prior interpretations, and other sources of
weight." The Court remanded the case for further proceedings con-
sistent with its opinion, holding that while the tariff ruling was not
entitled to Chevron deference, the ruling may be entitled to some de-
gree of respect.
HOLDING: Classification rulings are not entitled to Chevron defer-
ence, and instead only should be accorded "respect proportional to
its power to persuade."
IMPACT: The Court has found yet another opportunity to carve out
exceptions to the application of Chevron deference, once again limit-
ing an agency's ability to create policy.
NLRB v. Kentucky River Cmty Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706 (2001).
Federal Labor Law: The Supreme Court held that the burden of prov-
ing an employee's supervisory status rests with the employer, and the
NLRB's interpretation regarding what constitutes supervisory status
was held to be unreasonable.
FACTS: Kentucky River Community Care operates a care facility
for residents who suffer from mental illness and retardation. The
Kentucky State District Council of Carpenters petitioned the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") to represent all eligible em-
ployees of the care facility. The care facility objected to the inclu-
sion of six registered nurses as supervisors and therefore excluded
from the National Labor Relations Act's ("Act") protection. The
NLRB determined that the burden is on the employer to prove an
employee's supervisory status, and since that burden was not met, it
included the nurses in the bargaining unit. The NLRB refused re-
view of the determination, and since judicial review of these types of
determinations is not available, the employer refused to bargain with
the union. The union responded by bringing an unfair labor practices
claim against the employer. The NLRB stated that this kind of indi-
rect review could not be predicated on an attempt to challenge a rep-
resentation determination and granted summary judgment in favor of
the union. The Sixth Circuit refused to enforce the bargaining order
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of the NLRB, finding for the employer on review. The court held
that the NLRB erred in placing the burden of proving supervisory
status on the employer and rejected the NLRB's interpretation of
"independent judgment" in determining supervisory status.
ANALYSIS: The Court considered two issues. First, which party in
an unfair labor practice proceeding bears the burden of proving or
disproving an employee's supervisory status. Second, whether
judgment is not "independent judgment" to the extent that is in-
formed by professional or technical training or experience. The Act,
according to the Court, does not expressly allocate the burden of
proving a challenged employee's supervisory status, and therefore
the Board has filled the gap in the statute with a consistent rule that
the burden is borne by the party claiming that the employee is a su-
pervisor. The Court suggested that the appellate court should have
deferred to the Board's resolution of the statutory ambiguity. The
Court argued that the Board's rule is supported by the general rule of
statutory construction that the burden of proving justification or ex-
emption under a special exception to the prohibitions of a statute
generally rests with the party claiming its benefits. With regard to
the Board's interpretation of what constitutes supervisory status un-
der the Act, the Court first found that the term "independent judg-
ment" is ambiguous with regard to the extent of discretion allowed
under this term, and the Court stated that it falls within the Board's
discretion to determine what degree of discretion is allowed. How-
ever, the Court found the Board's determination regarding employ-
ees with the requisite degree of judgment was unreasonable. The
Court suggested that this interpretation inserted exclusion into the
Act that found no support in the Act itself.
HOLDING: The employer has the burden of proving the supervi-
sory status of an employee, and the Board's interpretation of what
constitutes supervisory status under the Act is unreasonable.
IMPACT: The Court has clarified an ambiguity in the Act, and the
NLRB's role in interpreting certain provisions.
Lujan v. G&G Fire Sprinklers, 532 U.S. 189 (2001). California La-
bor Law: Contract rights in court are sufficient to protect Due Process
Rights.
FACTS: G&G Fire Sprinklers ("G&G") is a subcontractor on sev-
eral California public works projects. The California Labor Code
("Code") authorizes the state to order withholding of payments due a
contractor on a public works project if the subcontractor on the pro-
ject fails to comply with Code requirements. The Code authorizes
similar withholding on the part of the contractor from the subcon-
tractor. The Ninth Circuit held that these code provisions violated
the Due Process Clause because they did not provide the subcontrac-
tor with a hearing before or after these actions were taken. The Code
requires that contractors and subcontractors on such projects pay
their workers prevailing wages determined by the state. If workers
were not paid the prevailing wage, the contractor was required to pay
each worker the difference between the prevailing wage and wages
paid, in addition to forfeiting a penalty to the state. The California
Department of Labor determined that G&G had failed to pay the
prevailing wage to its workers on three public works projects. The
awarding parties withheld from the contractors, and the contractors
then withheld the money owed to G&G. G&G sued the Department
of Labor claiming that the issuance of withholding notices without a
hearing constituted a deprivation of property without due process of
law, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court
declared the Labor Code unconstitutional, and the Ninth Circuit af-
firmed, stating that G&G has a property interest in being paid in full
for the construction work it has completed.
ANALYSIS: The Court began by acknowledging that where a state
law is challenged on due process grounds, courts must inquire as to
whether the state had deprived the claimant of protected property in-
terest and whether the state's procedures satisfy due process re-
quirements. The Court examined several cases in which the claimant
was denied a right by virtue of which he was presently entitled either
to exercise ownership dominion over real or personal property, and
distinguished the present case by explaining that G&G was not de-
nied any present entitlement, but rather a contract right. The Court
stated that if California makes ordinary judicial process available to
G&G for resolving a contractual dispute, that process qualifies as the
requisite due process.
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HOLDING: The Court held that the relevant provisions of the Cali-
fornia Labor Code do not violate the due process clause.
IMPACT: This case was an opportunity for the Court to affirm its
commitment to federalism.
Dep't of the Interior and Bureau of Indian Affairs v. Klamath
Water Users Protective Ass'n. 531 U.S. 1 (2001). Freedom of In-
formation Act and Indian Tribal Law: Communications between the
Department of the Interior and Indian tribes in the form of inter-
agency or intra-agency memoranda or letters are not exempt from dis-
closure requirements under the Freedom of Information Act.
FACTS: The Department of the Interior's Bureau of Reclamation
("Reclamation") administers a water irrigation project in parts of
Oregon and California along the Klamath River Basin. In order to
ensure that the Indian tribes were allocated a proper share of the wa-
ter rights, the Department's Bureau of Indian Affairs ("BIA") filed a
claim in Oregon state court. Thereafter, a nonprofit organization with
competing interests for water rights, the Klamath Water Users Pro-
tective Association ("KWUPA"), sought production of the commu-
nications between BIA and certain Indian tribes pursuant to the
Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"). BIA turned over several
documents to KWUPA, but asserted that other documents did not
have to be produced because they were exempt under FOIA.
KWUPA sued BIA to compel production.
ANALYSIS: Under 5 U.S.C. § 552, records held by a federal agency
must be disclosed upon request, unless the documents fall within one
of the enumerated exemptions. Under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5), federal
agencies do not have to disclose "inter-agency or intra-agency
memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a
party other than an agency in litigation with the agency." The Court
established a two-part test to determine if a document qualifies under
this exemption: (1) the source must be from a federal or state gov-
ernment agency, and (2) the source must be protected by one of the
judicially established privileges. The Court started by defining an
"intra-agency memorandum" as "one that has been received by an
agency, to assist it in the performance of its own functions, from a
person acting in a governmentally conferred capacity other than on
behalf of another agency - e.g., in a capacity as employee or con-
sultant to the agency, or as employee or officer of another govern-
mental unit (not an agency) that is authorized or required to provide
advice to the agency. The Court noted that prior case law has recog-
nized outside consultant communications as exempt under §
552(b)(5) because their opinions are objective and not self-serving.
In the present case, BIA tried to argue that the Indian tribes' com-
munications to Reclamation were similar to communications by
"outside consultants," and therefore exempt. However, the Court was
not persuaded by this argument, and stated that: "consultants may be
enough like the agency's own personnel to justify calling their com-
munications 'intra-agency.' The Tribes, on the contrary, necessarily
communicate with [BIA] with their own, albeit entirely legitimate,
interests in mind." Because there was insufficient water for every-
one, BIA's representation of the Indian tribes was adverse to other
users.
HOLDINGS: The Supreme Court held that the documents at issue
are not exempt under § 552(b)(5) as "inter-agency or intra-agency
memorandums or letters" because the consultations between the In-
dian tribes and the BIA were adverse to other users. Furthermore, the
Indian tribes were not consultants within the meaning of prior FOIA
case law because their position in the administrative and adjudicative
proceedings was self-serving and adverse.
IMPACT: The Court's decision erodes the candor between the
Government and the Indian tribes. In addition, it will affect the In-
dian tribes' expectation of confidentiality in communications with
the Government, and further hinder the Government from discharg-
ing its trust obligation. The Court specifically stated that it refused to
acknowledge this "Indian trust" exemption because it was not part of
the statutory text of FOIA.
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns. 531 U.S. 457 (2001). Federal
Environmental Law: The Supreme Court reviews the EPA's interpre-
tations of the NAAQS regarding Section 109 of the Clean Air Act, and
determines that its interpretations are unreasonable.
FACTS: Section 109(A) of Clean Air Act ("Act") requires the Ad-
ministrator of the EPA to promulgate National Ambient Air Quality
Standards ("NAAQS") for each air pollutant for which "air quality
criteria" have been listed under § 108 of the Act, and then review
those determinations once every five years. This dispute arose when
the Administrator raised the NAAQS for particulate matter and
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ozone. American Trucking Associations challenged the new stan-
dards. Several questions were presented in the case: (1) whether §
109(b)(1) of the Act delegates legislative power to the Administrator
of the EPA; (2) whether the Administrator may consider the cost of
implementation in setting NAAQS; (3) whether the court of appeals
had jurisdiction to review the EPA's interpretation of Part D of Title
I of the Act with respect to implementation of NAAQS; and (4) if so,
whether the EPA's interpretation of that part was permissible.
ANALYSIS: With regard to considering costs when setting
NAAQS, the Court looked to precedent, the plain language of the
statute and legislative history, and determined that the text of §
109(b) unambiguously bars cost considerations from the NAAQS
setting process. With regard to whether the EPA Administrator was
properly delegated the authority to promulgate NAAQS, the Court
suggested that the scope of discretion in § 109(b) was within the
outer limits of the nondelegation doctrine. The Court noted that
there has never been a requirement that a statute specifically state the
level of harm to be prevented and that § 109 falls well within the
scope of discretion permitted by the Court's precedent. With respect
to the EPA's authority to implement the revised ozone NAAQS in
areas where ozone levels currently exceed the maximum level per-
mitted by the set standard, the Court first had to dismiss the argu-
ment of the EPA that this decision was not reviewable because it was
not a final action. The Court maintained that the action taken by the
EPA was a final agency action subject to review under § 307 of the
Act because the action affected subsequent agency actions, and the
public was told that the decision regarding the NAAQS revisions
was final. The Court then used a traditional Chevron analysis to de-
termine which part of the statute controlled the setting of the
NAAQS in nonattainment areas. The Court found that EPA's im-
plementation policy was unreasonable and, therefore, unlawful. Con-
sequently, the Court refused to defer to the judgment of the EPA.
HOLDINGS: The EPA may not consider implementation costs in
setting NAAQS under § 109 of the Act; section 109 is a lawful dele-
gation of power to the EPA; the EPA's interpretations were review-
able; and the EPA's interpretations were unreasonable.
IMPACT: The Court here provided clarity to the EPA, and once
again carved away at the Chevron doctrine.
Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United States Army
Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001). Environmental Law: The Su-
preme Court decides whether the Army Corps' rule extending the
definition of "navigable waters" is permissible under its authority pur-
suant to the Clean Water Act.
FACTS: The Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County ("Solid
Waste") in Chicago, Illinois wanted to develop a disposal site for
baled hazardous solid waste. The City wanted to purchase an aban-
doned gravel pit and applied for all local, state, and federal permits.
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers ("Army Corps") asserted juris-
diction over the balefill after finding out that the fill was a habitat for
several species of migratory birds, and instituted the "Migratory Bird
Rule." All local and state authorities granted the required permits,
but the Army Corps refused to do so. Solid Waste filed suit under
the Administrative Procedures Act challenging the jurisdiction of the
Army Corps as well as the merits of the permit denial.
ANALYSIS: The issue was whether § 404(a) of the Clean Water
Act ("Act") could be extended to these waters, and if so, whether
Congress could exercise such authority under the Commerce Clause.
The Court found that this interpretation of the statute exceeded the
Army Corps' power for several reasons. First, the interpretations
were based upon a failed legislative proposal, and the Court found
this to be a dangerous ground on which to rest an interpretation. Fur-
ther, the Court said that § 404(g) does not conclusively determine the
construction to be placed on the term "waters" as it appears else-
where in the Act. The Court stated that when an administrative in-
terpretation of a statute invokes the outer limits of Congress' power,
there must be a clear indication that Congress intended that result.
According to the Court, there is a prudential desire not to needlessly
address constitutional questions, as well as an assumption that Con-
gress does not casually authorize administrative agencies to interpret
in such a manner as to intentionally push the limit. The Court sug-
gested that this concern is heightened when the administrative inter-
pretation alters the federal-state framework. The Commerce Clause
is not unlimited. The Court stated that permitting the Army Corps to
claim federal jurisdiction over ponds and mudflats falling within the
"Migratory Bird Rule" would result in a significant infringement of
the states' traditional and primary power over land and water use.
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HOLDING: The "Migratory Bird Rule" exceeds the authority
granted the Army Corps of Engineers under § 404(a) of the Clean
Water Act.
IMPACT: The Court has limited the discretion of the Army Corps
by clarifying provisions of the Clean Water Act, and has once again
limited a statute founded in the Commerce Clause.
FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
Miller v. AT&T Corp., 250 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 2001). Federal Labor
Law: Secretary of Labor's interpretations of FMLA upheld.
FACTS: Kimberly Miller ("Miller") had taken numerous days off of
work as a result of illnesses over the course of her employment with
AT&T, eventually culminating in disciplinary action and a notice
that she may be terminated if further absences occurred. In Decem-
ber of 1996, Miller began to feel ill while at work. Though she did
not feel well, she finished the workday. The next day, however, she
was unable to work and went to see a doctor. She was diagnosed
with the flu and dehydration as well as low white blood cell and
platelet counts. Miller missed work from December 28 to January 1
due to her illness, but her doctor provided her with work-excuse
slips. Miller then requested leave under the Family Medical Leave
Act (FMLA) for the dates of her illness. AT&T subsequently denied
her request and terminated Miller in March for her excessive absen-
teeism. The denial of leave was due to AT&T's understanding that
the flu was not a serious medical condition sufficient to qualify for
leave under FMLA. Miller spent several months seeking employ-
ment and eventually went to school and acquired training to become
an operating room technician. However, her earnings in this em-
ployment were $30 less per day than her earnings with AT&T.
Miller then filed suit, alleging that AT&T violated her rights under
FMLA by denying her leave, resulting in her termination. The lower
court found in her favor and AT&T appealed. AT&T claimed that if
the flu was found to be sufficient to be a serious medical condition
under FMLA, then the Act was invalid because such an interpreta-
tion was contrary to legislative intent.
ANALYSIS: The court granted Chevron deference to the language
of FMLA as put forth by the Secretary of Labor through delegation
by Congress. However, the court affirmed its role as the final inter-
preter of statutory language. The court examined the language as a
whole and the policy of the act as described by Congress at the time
of delegation. The court held that the flu was a sufficiently serious
medical condition where it also met the language requiring three
consecutive days of incapacity with two days of treatment.
HOLDING: The court held that the language of the FMLA as put
forth by the Secretary of Labor was not contrary to Congress' intent
in delegating this power.
IMPACT: The Court has affirmed its own power to be the ultimate
interpreter of statutory language, and thus has affirmed its ability to
review and reverse action taken by administrative agencies.
SEVENTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
Matz v. Household Int'l Tax Reduction Inv. Plan, 265 F.3d 572
(7th Cir. 2001). IRS Interpretations of ERISA: Court declines to de-
fer to IRS interpretation of ERISA statute using deference principles
set forth in United States v. Mead.
FACTS: Robert Matz ("Matz"), filed an action under the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA") alleging that he was en-
titled to benefits as a result of a partial termination of his retirement
plan. The district court held that both vested and non-vested partici-
pants should be counted in making the determination of partial ter-
mination and that multiple plan years could be aggregated. Represen-
tatives of the plan contested the holding on an interlocutory appeal.
The court of appeals upheld the rulings. The Internal Revenue Ser-
vice ("IRS") filed an amicus curiae brief putting forth a statutory in-
terpretation. The court of appeals afforded Chevron deference re-
quiring that the statutory interpretation of the IRS be given
deference. The court also concluded that this interpretation was rea-
sonable. The representatives of the plan appealed to the United
States Supreme Court, which vacated and remanded to the Seventh
Circuit for further consideration in light of the Court's ruling in
United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
ANALYSIS: The issue before the Seventh Circuit on remand was
the extent to which the courts must defer to the interpretation of
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"partial termination" by the IRS found in the amicus curiae brief,
which is one of the agencies responsible for administering the partial
termination statute. The court in this case relied heavily upon the
Mead case in determining what level of deference should be given to
the IRS interpretations of the regulations governing the ERISA cal-
culations involved. The Mead Court held that Chevron deference is
mandatory when Congress has expressly or implicitly indicated an
intent that an agency have the power to speak with the force of law
on a given matter and the agency's position on the matter is reason-
able. The Supreme Court in Mead stated that the intent of Congress
could be found when it provides for relatively formal procedures,
such as notice and comment rulemaking or formal adjudication. In
comparing the present position of the IRS with a long line of cases,
the court found that the amicus curiae brief was not a result of for-
mal policymaking procedure, but rather was based upon "some"
revenue rulings and an agency manual. The court concluded that
only Skidmore deference was appropriate because the position set
forth by the IRS in its amicus curiae brief was supported only by
"some" revenue rulings and an agency manual. In applying Skidmore
deference, the court held that the IRS position in the amicus curiae
brief was not persuasive such as to be granted deferential treatment.
The court of appeals reversed and remanded to the district court for
further proceedings.
HOLDING: The Seventh Circuit held that the IRS' position in the
amicus curiae brief was an informal agency policy pronouncement
that is not entitled to Chevron deference.
IMPACT: The court took an opportunity to further clarify and limit
the circumstances in which Chevron deference would be applied.
Agencies must beware, as deference will only be given in strict regu-
lation and official interpretation situations.
Ester v. Principi, 250 F.3d 1068 (7th Cir. 2001). Agency Procedures:
If agencies make a ruling on the merits they waive their right to time-
liness objections.
FACTS: McArthur Ester ("Ester") was denied a promotion by his
employer, the Department of Veteran's Affairs ("the VA"). Ester
brought suit on the grounds that the failure to promote him was in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The VA advertised the
availability of a position that was one level above Ester's current
position with the VA. Mr. Ester applied for the promotion but was
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sition with the VA. Mr. Ester applied for the promotion but was
later informed that a female applicant filled the position. Mr. Ester
filed a complaint and had a series of meetings with a counselor from
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). Prior
to Ester's final meeting with the EEOC investigator, he received a
notice of final meeting which stated that he had fifteen days to file a
complaint. After the final meeting, the issue had not been resolved to
his satisfaction but he waited until thirty-three days after the notice
to file his complaint. The EEOC investigated the complaint without
noting the lateness of the complaint. The investigator at first found
in Mr. Ester's favor, but later reversed and ruled that there was no
Title VII violation. Further, the investigator specifically found that
all procedural requirements had been met. Three and a half years
later, the VA formally ruled that there was no violation and issued a
right to sue letter. Mr. Ester then filed suit in federal court. The VA
did not mention the procedural requirements. In response to the suit,
the VA asserted for the first time that the original complaint after the
investigation was untimely. Ester responded that the VA had waived
its right to assert procedural defect because they had not raised the
issue until the federal suit. The lower court rejected the waiver ar-
gument and awarded summary judgment to the VA. Mr. Ester ap-
pealed the decision.
ANALYSIS: The Seventh Circuit analogized this instance to situa-
tions where a party to a suit fails initially to raise an issue, but later
attempts to do so. In following prior decisions, the court consistently
ruled that such an act cannot be done. The Seventh Circuit held that
the EEOC's situation was not distinguishable. The court continued,
noting that administrative agencies are required to fully state the rea-
sons for their findings. Finally, the court analogized to other federal
and state actions where all procedural issues must be ruled upon in
order to prevent automatic waiver.
HOLDING: The Seventh Circuit held that when an agency decides
a case on the merits, without addressing the question of timeliness,
the agency has waived the timeliness defense in a subsequent suit.
IMPACT: The Court holds agencies to the same requirements of
justice as all other individuals and organizations, making the mes-
sage clear, once again, that the Court will be scrutinizing the actions
that administrative agencies take.
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ELEVENTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
Bank of Am., N.A. v. FDIC, 244 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 2001). FDIC
Regulations: Interpretive letter issued by FDIC was given Chevron
deference.
FACTS: Congress established a two-system insurance deposit
scheme for banks to protect depositors. As a result of the numerous
bank failures in the 1980's, Congress implemented a series of regula-
tions that prevented banks from shifting money to accounts that had
a lower deposit rate. Among the regulations was a five-year morato-
rium on account transfers to the lower deposit rate accounts from the
higher rate accounts. Further, the moratorium affected mergers be-
tween banks and branches of banks that would result in lower de-
posit premiums. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
("FDIC") issued an interpretive letter clarifying the details of a spe-
cific type of transaction between branches of different classifica-
tions. The FDIC later codified this interpretation and stated that the
codification was unambiguous. The FDIC later pursued action
against the Bank of America ("BOA") stating that they owed a large
sum of money as a result of the manner in which they had transferred
funds. BOA filed suit against the FDIC claiming that the action
taken was beyond the powers of the FDIC because they had ex-
ceeded their statutory authority under the plain meaning of the above
noted statute.
ANALYSIS: The Eleventh Circuit found that while the supporting
language of the statute (the preamble) did speak to the issue, the
statute itself did not. The court did not accept BOA's claim of in-
consistency between the preamble and the later interpretation be-
cause it was not a post-hoc interpretation, but rather a later clarifica-
tion of an unaddressed point in the code. Thus, the court held there
was ambiguity that necessitated the later interpretation which was al-
lowed by Chevron deference.
HOLDING: The Eleventh Circuit held that Chevron deference was
applicable to the present case because the language of the statute did
not speak directly to the present issue.
IMPACT: The court shows that it will uphold the traditional Chev-
ron doctrine. As long as there is an interpretation of a statute con-
taining ambiguities, the agency will be granted deference by courts.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
Air Transp. Ass'n of Canada v. FAA, 254 F.3d 271 (D.C. Cir.
2001), vacated by 276 F.3d 599 (D.C. Cir. 2001). FAA Regulations:
The FAA fee schedules for international flights were reasonable.
FACTS: Under the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996
("Act"), the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") has the au-
thority to charge fees to foreign airlines that fly into American air-
space. The Act requires that all fees for foreign overflights be di-
rectly related to the costs incurred by the FAA in assisting with the
overflights. The FAA established a fee schedule for foreign over-
flights based on a formula including the value of the airline services
provided. Air Transportation Association of Canada ("ATAC") con-
tested this action as being beyond the scope of powers given to the
FAA to establish fees because the enabling act specifically required
that the fees must be based upon the service costs incurred by the
FAA. The FAA amended the fee schedule to reflect different fees
for flights over land and flights over American ocean space. The
amended rule did not contain an explanation of how the FAA arrived
at the fee schedule but the FAA did later provide two reports ex-
plaining the difference and how the schedule was developed.
ANALYSIS: The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals ad-
dressed two issues raised by ATAC. First, ATAC argued that notice
and comment procedures were not used to pass the amended rule.
Second, the court analyzed whether the amended rule was within the
FAA's delegated powers. The court reasoned that the amended rule
establishes only an initial fee schedule and is thus not subject to the
full notice and comment procedures. The court reasoned that the
FAA failed to sufficiently justify the connection between the rate
charged and the costs to the agency in providing services.
HOLDING: The court held that because it vacated the initial rule,
there was no requirement that the amended rule also utilize notice
and comment procedures. Thus, the court held that the amended rule
was simply an interim rule. In addressing the fee schedule proposed
by the FAA, the court held that it could not be directly linked to the
costs of providing services. Thus, it was arbitrary and capricious.
IMPACT: This court followed the Supreme Court's lead, making
room for deference to administrative decisions only where it sees fit.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
Kokal v. Massanari, 163 F. Supp. 2d 1122 (N.D. Cal. 2001). Social
Security Law: The District Court closely reviewed the ALJ's decision
regarding Social Security Administration regulations.
FACTS: Tammy Kokal ("Kokal") suffered from an ankle injury and
obesity which also caused various other health problems. As a result,
she claimed social security disability benefits. Kokal had visited
numerous doctors and hospitals due to pains in her legs and back; the
doctors recommended weight loss to lessen the pain. The Social Se-
curity Administration ("SSA") and the Appeals Council denied bene-
fits, finding that Kokal was capable of menial occupations as noted
by the Department of Rehabilitation.
ANALYSIS: The issue was whether the Social Security Administra-
tive Law Judge ("AU") erred in failing to consider whether Kokal
was disabled due to the combination of her obesity and other physi-
cal impairments, either under the obesity listing in place at the time
of her administrative hearing, or under the regulations on obesity that
replaced that listing while her case was pending before the Appeals
Council. The court found that obesity should have been used as a
factor to analyze the general physical impairments in "step three" of
the SSA's five-step disability analysis. The court concluded that
obesity as a factor from the then-applicable list would have conclu-
sively deemed Kokal disabled. Additionally, the court maintained
that the AU should not have considered the amended obesity listing
while Kokal's claim was pending on appeal with the Appeals Coun-
cil. Based upon precedent, the court rejected the argument that
newly amended rules and legislations had retroactive effect on pend-
ing cases or appeals.
HOLDING: The court found that the SSA erred by only considering
the ankle injury as a disability when there were other concomitant
physical impairments, including obesity.
IMPACT: This case serves as a reminder that deference to adminis-
trative agency determinations only goes as far as a court will allow
it, especially with regard to questions of law.
In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether Products Liability Litigation,
174 F. Supp.2d 4 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). Environmental Law and Civil
Procedure: A New York District Court interprets the Clean Air Act.
FACTS: Water-well owners brought products liability claims
against petroleum companies for contamination of ground water
caused by the use of methyl tertiary butyl ether ("MTBE") to oxy-
genate petroleum products as required under the Clean Air Act
("Act"). The petroleum companies claimed preemption under the
Act.
ANALYSIS: The issue was whether there were substantial grounds
for differences of opinion in the courts, with regards to the use of
MTBE under the Act as the only method to oxygenate petroleum, so
as to make an interlocutory appeal appropriate. The court considered
three factors and created six additional factors for determining a con-
trolling question of law. The court cited to the fact that "great care"
should be used in granting a certification, and that § 1292(b) of the
Act should be "narrowly construed." Furthermore, the court noted
that certification should be granted only in "exceptional circum-
stances." Additionally, the court recognized that it has "unfettered
discretion to deny certification" for an interlocutory appeal. The
court also noted that an interlocutory appeal would be inappropriate
where it could bring an end to all litigation concerning a particular
matter.
HOLDING: The New York District Court held that the Act did not
specifically require the use of MTBE, but merely required that all pe-
troleum fuels be oxygenated without prescribing a specific method-
ology. The court determined that there was no substantial ground for
differences of opinion as to whether the Act required the use of
MTBE. Thus, the interlocutory appeal was inappropriate.
IMPACT: Attempting an interlocutory appeal in administrative law
matters in New York, at least according to this court, may be a losing
battle.
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CALIFORNIA STATE COURT
McCal v. PacifiCare of California. Inc., 21 P.3d 1189 (Cal. 2001).
Preemption Doctrine: The exhaustion of administrative remedies is not
required in all circumstances under Medicare Act.
FACTS: This case involved a health maintenance organization
("HMO") that denied George McCall ("McCall"), now deceased,
medical referrals and lung transplants when Medicare supplemented
the coverage. McCall filed suit, citing nine tort claims and twenty
violations of statutory duties owed. PacifiCare of California, Inc.
("PacifiCare") filed motions for summary judgment and motions to
dismiss the suit based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction of the
state courts. The trial court held that it had no jurisdiction. The
court of appeals reversed, stating that McCall was not seeking re-
view of benefits coverage or reimbursement but was seeking tort
damages and therefore McCall's claim did not arise under the Act.
ANALYSIS: The issues were (1) whether common law tort claims
are preempted by the Medicare Act ("Act"), such as to bar a suit
from being presented to a state court; (2) whether an administrative
agency would be able to provide adequate remedies to plaintiffs
claiming tort damages and not medical payment, coverage, or reim-
bursement; and (3) whether a plaintiff must exhaust all administra-
tive reviews before a damages claim can be brought in court. In the
instant case, based upon the statutory construction of the Act, the
California Supreme Court found that there was no preemption or ex-
clusive jurisdiction and found that the agency only exercised a lim-
ited jurisdiction in regards to denial of benefits and amount of bene-
fits. Additionally, the court found that the agency would only be
able to grant civil monetary penalties against PacifiCare, and that
this would be insufficient to cover any damage claims. The court
suggested that because the plaintiff was not seeking review of benefit
coverage, amount of coverage, or reimbursement, the plaintiffs
cause of action did not arise under the Act; therefore, the claim was
properly brought before the trial court. Additionally, the court rea-
soned that the Medicare agency did not have the power or authority
to grant the plaintiff damages. Because the award of damages was
limited to the judiciary, a requirement that plaintiffs exhaust all ad-
ministrative review was unnecessary and inadequate.
HOLDING: The California Supreme Court held that a plaintiff must
exhaust all administrative review if the claim has standing and sub-
stantive basis in the Act or if non-administrative claims are inextri-
cably intertwined with the Medicare claim. Additionally, if the
statutory language clearly provides the agency with exclusive juris-
diction, then a plaintiff must exhaust the administrative review pro-
cedures before the claim can be brought for judicial review. How-
ever, the court created some exceptions to this rule. If the claim
arising under the Act is only collateral to the main components of a
claim, or if a plaintiff can show colorable arguments that administra-
tive review would cause harm to the plaintiff, the court may review
the claim before all administrative procedures are complete.
IMPACT: The agency will not be able to exercise any jurisdiction if
the court decides to hear the claims. In essence, if the statute does
not clearly preempt the state courts or provide exclusive jurisdiction
over such issues, then the court may exercise jurisdiction over the
matter. If judicial review of the claim is preempted, then the plaintiff
must first exhaust all administrative review before seeking a judicial
review.
CONNECTICUT STATE COURT
MacDermid Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 778 A.2d 7 (Conn. 2001).
Uniform Administrative Procedure Act: The court addresses the
proper standard of review applied under the Uniform Administrative
Procedure Act for questions of fact.
FACTS: MacDermid, Inc. ("MacDermid") sought a declaratory
judgment that its spent etchant, a chemical product, was not a solid
waste; that its premises were not a waste treatment facility; and that
etchant was exempt from the Department of Environmental Protec-
tions' ("DEP") regulations. If exempt, MacDermid would not have
been required to obtain a permit to receive its used etchant, could re-
cycle the product without regulation, and properly sell or dispose of
its recycled products. The DEP determined that the spent etchant
was a solid waste and was a hazardous material that needed to be
regulated, thereby requiring a permit subject to review every five
years. The DEP further concluded that MacDermid was conducting
waste management which would come within the purview of its
regulations. MacDermid argued that it was not in the enterprise of
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waste management but instead was manufacturing new products and
was merely using the spent etchant as an ingredient in that manufac-
turing. After an extensive finding of facts regarding the chemical
processes and statutory interpretations, the Board concluded that
MacDermid was a waste management firm and that it was merely re-
cycling or reclaiming the byproducts. After exhausting all adminis-
trative review, MacDermid appealed to the trial court, which simply
affirmed the determination of the DEP based on a "substantial evi-
dence" standard of review.
ANALYSIS: The issue was whether the "substantial evidence" stan-
dard of review found in the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act
("UAPA") should be generally applicable. The Connecticut Su-
preme Court reasoned that agencies which have been given the duty
of applying and interpreting special legislation requiring experience,
expertise or technical knowledge in specialized fields require the
"substantial evidence" standard in order to extend a good deal of def-
erence. Based on the findings of the DEP, the court found that there
was substantial evidence to support the conclusion that MacDermid
was engaged in waste management. Additionally, the court found
that the statutory interpretation of the DEP was not unreasonable,
arbitrary, illegal, or an abuse of discretion. The court reasoned that
the DEP's interpretation was well supported by the statutory
language, precedent, and public policy. The court found the reason-
ing of the DEP that some violators might escape the permit require-
ment by simply redefining their chemical processes and stages was a
legitimate basis to support the interpretation and to adhere to the
intent of the statute.
HOLDING: The Connecticut Supreme Court held that the "substan-
tial evidence" standard was appropriate for reviewing factual deter-
minations and that the trial court appropriately applied the standard.
IMPACT: Essentially, The Uniform Administrative Procedure Act
standard was applied in this case. This standard will be applied in
technical or specialized fields where the court does not have the req-
uisite expertise, and courts applying it will grant substantial defer-
ence to the agency's determination. The standard of review is im-
portant because it provides an agency with wide latitude as to its
fact-finding ability in respect to its expertise.
ILLINOIS STATE COURT
AFM Messenger Serv., Inc. v. Dep't of Employment Sec., 763
N.E.2d 272 (Ill. 2001). Illinois Labor Law: The court addressed the
"clearly erroneous" standard of review used in addressing mixed ques-
tions of law and fact.
FACTS: Several former employees of AFM Messenger Service, Inc.
("AFM"), a messenger service company that conducts same-day
delivery of packages, filed for unemployment benefits. However,
AFM did not carry any unemployment insurance as required by law
because it had considered its drivers to be independent contractors.
When the Department of Employment Security ("DES"), an unem-
ployment benefits agency, could not provide the requested benefits,
it triggered an audit of AFM. The referee determined at an adminis-
trative hearing that the drivers were not independent contractors but
were employees of AFM under the statute and fined AFM based on
the premiums it should have paid. The Board of the DES adopted
the determination. The trial court held that the determination was
neither against the manifest weight of the evidence nor contrary to
law. The appeals court affirmed that AFM failed to establish that its
drivers were independent contractors.
ANALYSIS: The issue was what standard of review was appropriate
when an administrative agency makes a determination based upon a
mixed question of law and fact. The Illinois Supreme Court defined
mixed questions of law and fact as involving an examination of the
legal effect of a given set of facts. The court defined the "clearly er-
roneous" standard of review as a hybrid between the "manifest
weight of the evidence" standard and de novo review. The court
maintained that due to the experience and expertise of the adminis-
trative agency, it should be accorded with a "clearly erroneous"
standard of review, rather than the "manifest weight of the evidence"
standard that is applied by appellate courts in matters involving
mixed questions of law and fact.
HOLDING: The Illinois Supreme Court held that the "clearly erro-
neous" standard was appropriate for mixed questions of law and fact
and affirmed the agency's determination.
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IMPACT: The deference that determinations of administrative
agencies in Illinois will receive has been tempered in the sense that
in mixed questions of law and fact the courts in their review will use
a somewhat less deferential standard.
KENTUCKY STATE COURT
Revenue Cabinet v. Lazarus. Inc., 49 S.W.3d 172 (Ky. 2001). Taxa-
tion and the Doctrine of Contemporaneous Construction: An admin-
istrative agency's long-standing interpretation of a statute that incor-
rectly applies the law is not shielded by the doctrine of
contemporaneous construction.
FACTS: Lazarus, Inc. ("Lazarus") operates retail stores throughout
Kentucky, and distributes pre-printed newspaper inserts and cata-
logs. In 1994, the Kentucky Revenue Cabinet ("Cabinet") audited
Lazarus's operations. During the audit, Cabinet discovered that
Lazarus used an out-of-state printing company to produce the inserts
and catalogs. The out-of-state printer performed the creation, design
and printing of the inserts and catalogs. In addition, the out-of-state
printer occasionally mailed the catalogs directly to Lazarus' custom-
ers in Kentucky. As a result, the Cabinet assessed a use tax on Laza-
rus for the activities of the out-of-state printer.
ANALYSIS: The Kentucky Supreme Court had to determine if
Lazarus was liable for use tax when the out-of-state printer (1) cre-
ated, designed and printed the inserts and catalogs, and subsequently
shipped them back to Lazarus in Kentucky and (2) directly mailed
the catalogs from the out-of state printer to potential customers in
Kentucky. The court relied on the doctrine of contemporaneous con-
struction to prohibit the Cabinet from assessing the use tax. The doc-
trine states that when an administrative agency applies a policy over
a long period of time, that agency cannot unilaterally revoke it. Thus,
the doctrine precludes "internal policy changes by the administrators
to reverse and overturn long-standing interpretations that have, over
time, become part and parcel of the fabric of the law being adminis-
tered." In the present case, the Cabinet has continuously adhered to
the policy against taxing inserts for over thirty years. However, the
court determined that the Cabinet was required by law to assess a use
tax on inserts over the past thirty years. The court stated that "con-
temporaneous construction cannot be founded upon an administra-
tive agency's failure to correctly apply the law." Thus, the inaction
of the Cabinet over thirty years cannot be treated as contemporane-
ous construction.
HOLDING: The Kentucky Supreme Court held that an administra-
tive agency cannot change the law by mistakenly applying it over a
long period of time. Thus, the court concluded that the newspaper in-
serts and catalogs were subject to the "use tax" imposed by Ken-
tucky because they qualified as "tangible property store, used, and
consumed in Kentucky."
IMPACT: Administrative agencies in Kentucky that have relied
upon long-standing internal policy interpretations that fail to cor-
rectly apply laws will not be protected by the doctrine of contempo-
raneous construction.
OKLAHOMA STATE COURT
Walker v. Group Health Servs., Inc., 37 P.3d 749 (Okla. 2001).
Administrative Remedies: Exhaustion of administrative remedies is
not required to obtain judicial review.
FACTS: Cynthia Walker ("Walker") fainted while she was teaching
in her class and was rushed to the emergency room. Walker was a
member of a health maintenance organization ("HMO"), Group
Health Services, Inc. The emergency medical treatment and all sub-
sequent treatment were denied coverage and reimbursement by her
HMO. Walker requested review. Based on the contract, the HMO
was required to respond within thirty days; however, the HMO failed
to respond for more than three months and also failed to provide ap-
peals information. For failure to pay medical expenses, the emer-
gency service provider garnished Walker's wages and froze and ac-
quired her "escrow" account. As a result, Walker's attempt to
purchase a home failed. Walker retained an attorney to obtain griev-
ance-appeals information from the carrier which caused the carrier to
immediately reimburse insured. After the reimbursement, her attor-
ney brought suit for bad faith and breach of contract. The carrier
succeeded in dismissing the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion of the court based on State and Education Employees Group In-
surance Act ("Act"), which required any complaints or disputes to be
resolved by the Grievance Panel. The Act created and empowered
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the State and Education Employees Group Insurance Board
("Board") to promulgate grievance procedures. Under the delegated
authority, the Board created the Grievance Panel to resolve all dis-
putes with regard to insurance allowance, payment of claims, eligi-
bility for coverage, and provision of services. The trial court sus-
tained the motion and dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction.
ANALYSIS: The issue was whether an insured is required to ex-
haust all administrative remedies before seeking judicial review
when such a requirement cannot provide adequate remedies of com-
pensatory and punitive damages for (1) breach of implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing and (2) bad faith breach of insurance
contract. The court also examined whether administrative remedies
must be exhausted where the suit does not pertain to disputes of in-
surance allowance, payment of claims, eligibility for coverage, and
provisions of services. The Oklahoma Supreme Court found that,
because the suit was not initiated to recover reimbursement, such ac-
tions were not precluded by the Act. Based on various precedents,
statutory interpretation, and legislative intent, the court found that
the Grievance Panel's primary jurisdiction only encompassed insur-
ance allowance, payment of claims, eligibility for coverage, and pro-
vision of services. The court decided that compensatory and puni-
tive damages could not be remedied by an administrative proceeding.
HOLDING: The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that an insured may
bring such suits for judicial review and is not required to exhaust all
administrative review procedures under the Act.
IMPACT: If, by reimbursing, the protection of the Act is not appli-
cable, the effect of this ruling would be that carriers will simply and
continuously deny coverage, reimbursement, and services so as to
preclude a litigation. This will force a plaintiff to bring a compliant
to an administrative body rather than court. By simply exhausting
the financial reserves of poor insured plaintiffs, the carrier will be
substantially benefited both as to cost of services as well as expenses
of litigation. However, the realities of exhausting all administrative
remedies make this an unlikely option.
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TEXAS STATE COURT
Subaru of Am.. Inc. v. David McDavid Nissan. Inc.. 2001 WL
578337, 44 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 779 (Tex. 2001) (note that this case has
not yet been published in the official reporters as of the publication
date of this issue, and therefore, the opinion is subject to modification
or withdrawal). State Motor Vehicle Board Jurisdiction: The court
addressed the fact that courts maintain secondary jurisdiction over
administrative agency proceedings.
FACTS: David McDavid Nissan, Inc. ("McDavid"), an automobile
dealer, sued Subaru of America, Inc. ("Subaru") for refusing to allow
the dealer to relocate after Subaru orally consented to the relocation.
McDavid wanted to relocate its two facilities between the Oldsmo-
bile and Subaru locations. McDavid allegedly obtained an oral per-
mission from the Vice-President of Subaru. After near completion
of the relocations, Subaru reneged, stating that it would never permit
relocation at that particular site. No written request or permission for
relocation was obtained or granted. After relationships became
tenuous, McDavid sold all of its Subaru dealerships. Thereafter, Su-
baru permitted another dealer to relocate at the site where McDavid
desired to relocate. McDavid brought suit, claiming various code
violations and torts; Subaru tried to summarily dismiss the suit
claiming that the cause of action arose before the Texas Motor Vehi-
cle Board ("TMVB") in the administrative proceedings. The trial
court claimed that it had no concurrent jurisdiction to try or review
such matters and dismissed the suit. The appeals court held that the
legislature gave the TMVB exclusive jurisdiction over dealership-
manufacturer code violations and that to dismiss such claims would
close off access to the courts, right to jury trial, and open trial and
would be unconstitutional based on the Texas constitution.
ANALYSIS: The issue is whether the TMVB had exclusive jurisdic-
tion or merely primary jurisdiction over such matters as dealer-
relocation disputes. Upon de novo review, the Texas Supreme Court
applied the "primary jurisdiction doctrine," maintaining that if an
administrative agency has sole primary jurisdiction, then the judicial
system may review the matter only after the administrative agency
has an opportunity to hear the matter and make specific findings of
fact. The court also reasoned that allocation of exclusive and pri-
mary jurisdiction is statutorily driven and therefore requires judicial
interpretation. The court noted that in this case the statute granted
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limited judicial review of TMVB holdings. Additionally, the court
reasoned that the limited remedies available to an injured party from
an administrative review implies that an administrative proceeding
cannot be the only recourse for the injured party and that the courts
are open to redress these shortcomings of the administrative process.
HOLDING: The Texas Supreme Court held that the administrative
agency, TMVB, had primary jurisdiction, and the trial court had sec-
ondary jurisdiction after the agency's review.
IMPACT: This is an important decision for Texas administrative
agencies because it ensures their ability to have first review of cases
in their jurisdiction, while the rights of the parties are still protected
from arbitrary agency decisions through review in the courts.
Cont'l Cas. Ins. Co. v. Functional Restoration Assocs., 19 S.W.3d
393 (Tex. 2000). Texas Labor Law: There is no right to judicial re-
view of administrative orders unless the ruling affects a vested prop-
erty right.
FACTS: James Hood ("Hood") suffered an on-the-job injury com-
pensable under the Workers' Compensation Act ("Act"). At the time,
Continental Casualty Insurance Company ("Continental") was the
workers' compensation insurance carrier for Hood's employer. Hood
received medical care, including some rehabilitation and specific
treatment, from Functional Restoration Associates and Productive
Rehabilitation Institute of Dallas for Ergonomics (collectively,
"FRA"). Continental required FRA to forward all preauthorization
forms that would be reviewed by Continental's doctor. If a service
was found by Continental's doctor not to be reasonable or necessary,
then the benefit or payment was denied to FRA. In this case, Conti-
nental denied payment after the service was performed on Hood
based on its finding that the service was not necessary. FRA brought
suit for reimbursement before the Workers' Compensation Commis-
sion ("WCC") which found in its favor. Continental sought judicial
review of the WCC's determination at the trial court. The trial court
dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction. The appellate court re-
versed, finding that even though Continental did not have a statutory
right of judicial review, the court found that it was entitled to a right
to judicial review because it was an inherent right based on the state
and federal constitution, as well as due process rights in vested prop-
erty rights.
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ANALYSIS: The issues were: (1) whether the Act provides a statu-
tory ight of judicial review for carriers such as Continental; and (2)
whether there is an inherent right of judicial review in administrative
proceedings. The Texas Supreme Court engaged in an extensive
analysis of the statutory construction, analysis of legislative intent,
and interpretation of the Act. The court noted that even though the
legal area of dispute committed to the purview of the WCC is
"small," it is nonetheless exclusive and must be exhausted before a
party can claim a right to judicial review unless the statute remains
silent or denies a right of judicial review. The court maintained that
if a right vested in property is adversely affected, a party is not re-
quired to first exhaust administrative review before a claim can be
brought before the court. Since Continental did not raise this inher-
ent right of judicial review at the trial court level, the Texas Supreme
Court declined to address it.
HOLDING: The Texas Supreme Court held that there is no right to
judicial review of an administrative order unless there is a statute
providing a right, an order or determination that adversely affects a
vested property right, or a violation of a constitutional right. Further,
there was no statutory right of judicial review in matters involving
payment and benefit disputes under the Workers' Compensation Act.
IMPACT: Based on Texas law, unless a party is specifically granted
a statutory right of judicial review, the party must first exhaust the
administrative review process before seeking judicial review. No
deviation from the three-level administrative review would be per-
mitted, unless there is an inherent right that is being adversely af-
fected. Thus, even if the legislature removes a right to judicial re-
view or grants an agency exclusive jurisdiction, a party could bypass
the agency if it claims that its vested or inherent right is being ad-
versely affected. Thus, parties can bypass the agency by claiming
that a property right is being adversely affected and gain access to
the court.
Occidental Permian Ltd. v. R.R. Comm'n of Texas, 47 S.W.3d 801
(Tex. App. 2001). Judicial Notice Requirements: Judicial notice is
required for all administrative determinations and regulations regard-
ing retroactive tax benefits.
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FACTS: Occidental Permian Ltd. ("Occidental") brought suit to re-
verse the Railroad Commission's ("RRC") decision to deny them
retroactive tax benefits. Occidental initially requested approval for
an expansion of its "enhanced oil recovery project." The expansion
program required water and carbon dioxide to be pumped under
ground so as to flood the oil reserves and to force oil to the surface.
If approved for an expansion, Occidental would have gained substan-
tial tax benefits under the Texas Tax Code, but Occidental was de-
nied after application. However, Occidental began its expansion op-
eration despite the disapproval and continued its operation because it
deemed it profitable enough even without the tax benefit. Two other
petroleum companies also applied for an expansion and were also
denied. However, these two companies requested an appeal and
hearing. Subsequent to the hearings, the denial was reversed and
permission was granted. Occidental did not appeal nor request a
hearing. After several years, Occidental requested a hearing before
RRC for "retroactive" tax benefits for the expansion. The state tax
examiners denied retroactive tax benefits and RRC adopted the rul-
ing of the examiners.
ANALYSIS: The issue was whether the Texas Court of Appeals is
required to take judicial notice of all administrative determinations
and regulations to permit introduction of "outside" information in an
administrative proceeding. The court stated that administrative de-
terminations are to be examined under a "substantial evidence" stan-
dard of review. RRC ruled against Occidental because the statute
and rules explicitly required that all tax benefits be approved before
commencing an expansion plan. The court maintained that even
though RRC had reversed itself in two prior cases upon appeal, this
did not entitle Occidental to a retroactive application and did not en-
title them to a hearing after it had commenced operations. The court
also ruled that RRC's actions were not arbitrary, capricious, or an
abuse of discretion because nothing in the administrative precedent
prevented the denial of benefits.
HOLDING: The Texas Court of Appeals held that the courts must
take judicial notice of all administrative regulations and determina-
tions.
IMPACT: This case provides Texas administrative agencies with a
bit more deference from the courts.
